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               Priorities and Registered Land during the Registration Gap 
 
Introduction 
The recent High Court Chancery case of Baker v Craggs, which was heard before Newey J in 
the Bristol District Registry, highlights the importance to practitioners of preparing proper 
plans, and of answering land registry requisitions in a timely fashion during the registration 
gap in order to avoid applications being cancelled, thereby losing priority.1 The case is of 
further interest to practitioners in that it considers , by reference to the registration gap,  when 
an estate contract is not an estate contract andand it also acts as a reminder for practitioners to 
be vigilant in checking third party rights when dealing with transfers of part  
         The decision  also considers overriding interests which is useful  to undergraduate 
students of land law, in particular, for the trial judge’s analysis of the meaning of “actual 
occupation”in the context of the Land Registration Act 2002. Further, both practitioners and 
students will be interested in the academic arguments which have arisen following the case 
concerning basic concepts in relation to the meaning of a “legal estate” and the operation of 
the doctrine of overreaching. In the specific context of overreaching, there has been academic 
criticism2 of that part of Newey J’s judgment which held that the grant of a legal easement, 
being a derivative interest in land, could trigger overreaching. 
      This case note will argue that the trial judge was correct in his application of the law, 
insofar as it relates to overriding interests, but that he applied too broad an interpretation of 
the term “legal estate” in section 2 (1) Law of Property Act 1925 and that the overreaching    
machinery provided for in that section should not have been invoked. As for the issue as to 
                                                          
1 [2016] EWHC 3250 (Ch). Judgment was handed down on 15 December 2016. 
2 See M.Dixon, Editors Notebook, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, (2017) 81 Conv. pp3-5. 
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when an estate contract ceases to be an estate contract in the context of registered land, this is 
a difficult issue and notwithstanding the judge’s finding that there was no estate contract  
following completion of the defendant’s transfer, those difficulties and uncertainties still 
remain. 
The facts 
In brief, the case concerned the efficacy of the grant of a right of way. A certain farm in 
Somerset had been in the sole ownership of Mr and Mrs Charlton until 2012, at which point 
they sold off various tranches of the farm to two different purchasers, retaining certain 
buildings for themselves to be used as their residence. The transfers made by the Charltons 
were in favour of Mr Craggs, the defendant, and Mr and Mrs Baker, the claimants. The 
various transfers may be summarised as follows: 
      On 17 January 2012, there was a transfer of part to the defendant comprising some 18 
acres of fields and barns together with a yard along with a right of way over a driveway 
leading from the yard over part of the Charltons’ retained land. The defendant’s solicitors had 
carried out the usual land registry search prior to completion with a priority period expiring 
on 28 February 2012. The defendant’s transfer was first lodged for registration on 10 
February 2012, i.e. within the thirty day priority period prescribed under the Land 
Registration Rules 2003,3  and also within the prescribed two month period for applying for 
registration of title.4 On 22 March 2012 the land registry raised a requisition stating that the 
access way from the yard over the Charltons’ retained land was not shown on the plan 
attached to the transfer.  The defendant’s solicitors were given until 9 May 2012 to deal with 
the requisition. In fact, they did not deal with the requisition and the defendant’s application 
                                                          
3 See Land Registry Practice guide 12: official searches and outline applications, updated 9 January 2017, paras 
4.2 and 4.3. 
4 See section 6(4) Land Registration Act 2002. 
3 
 
for registration was cancelled on 9 May 2012. A fresh application was subsequently made 
with an amended plan and on 16 May 2012 the defendant was registered with title to the land 
which had been transferred to him. 
       In the meantime, on 9 February 2012 the Charltons had exchanged contracts in respect of 
the sales of other tranches of the farm to the claimants, comprising the farmhouse and a barn 
(the claimants’ barn). These sales were completed by way of two transfers on 20 February 
2012. It is important to note that the transfer of the claimants’ barn purported to grant the 
claimants a right of way over the very yard which had been transferred by the Charltons in 
favour of the defendant. The duplication of these rights had not been picked up by the 
defendant’s solicitors.  On 14 March 2012, the claimants were registered with the land 
transferred to them with the benefit of the rights over the defendant’s yard, and the 
defendant’s register was recorded as being subject to those rights. Accordingly, the question 
before the court was whether the claimants had the benefit of a right of way over the 
defendant’s yard which it will be recalled comprised part of the land transferred to him, and 
this gave rise to various legal issues. 
The legal issues 
It was common ground between the parties that up until the point at which the defendant 
became the registered proprietor of the yard he only had an equitable interest in the land 
transferred to him. It was also common ground that the provisions of s 29 Land Registration 
Act 2002 postponed the defendant’s equitable interest, unless it could be shown to have had 
priority at the time of registration in the claimant’s favour. In brief, the overarching issue in 
the case concerned whether the claimants’ transfer had priority over the defendant’s transfer, 
and this main issue was broken down into two subsidiary questions: namely, (1) whether, at 
the point when the transfer to the claimants was completed, the defendant had been in “actual 
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occupation” of the yard thereby providing the defendant with an overriding interest, and if so, 
(2) had any such overriding interest been overreached? These issues unfolded in the 
following three-staged approach adopted by the trial judge: 
1.In view of the fact that the defendant had first lodged his transfer within the priority period 
provided by his land registry search, that provided the defendant, at that point, with priority 
over a subsequent transfer lodged by the claimants. The trouble was that the defendant’s 
solicitors failed to deal with the land registry requisition promptly, and his application was 
cancelled on 9 May 2012. It will be recalled that the claimants’ right of way over the yard 
was registered in their favour on 14 March 2012, and following the cancellation on 9 May 
2012, this took priority over the defendant’s registration of title of the yard in his favour on 
16 May 2016. Any subsequent land registry search carried out by the defendant would have 
provided a second priority period in favour of the defendant, but it would not have been 
effective to extend the priority afforded by the defendant’s first land registry search.  
2. Therefore, what else could be done on the defendant’s behalf to give him priority? He only 
had an equitable interest, and the claimants had been registered with rights extending over the 
defendant’s yard. Counsel for the defendant argued that notwithstanding the effects of s 29 
Land Registration Act 2002, the defendant’s equitable interest took priority over the 
subsequent transfer in favour of the claimants on the basis that the defendant was at all 
material times “in actual occupation” of the yard, and that this constituted an overriding 
interest pursuant to the provisions of Schedule 3 Land Registration Act 2002, and as will be 
seen the trial judge made a finding to this effect in the defendant’s favour. 
3. As the trial judge had found for the defendant on the overriding interest point, the only 
course of action open to Counsel for the claimants was to argue that the rights giving rise to 
the overriding interest (i.e. the “actual occupation” by the defendant) had been effectively 
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overreached. It should be remembered that where the conditions which enable overreaching 
are satisfied, an overriding interest will not defeat overreaching.5 On the facts of the case, 
when the Charltons granted the claimants the easement , the claimants paid the capital monies 
in respect of the transfer of the claimant’s barn and easement over the defendant’s yard over 
to two trustees (i.e. Mr and Mrs Charlton) who then held the yard as bare trustees for the 
defendant (in the absence of “title by registration” in the defendant’s favour), thereby, 
according to the trial judge, satisfying the requirements for overreaching the defendant’s 
equitable interest pursuant to sections 2 and 27 of the Law of Property Act 1925(LPA 1925). 
Counsel for the defendant advanced various arguments against this which will be considered 
in this note, but the analysis will move on to consider the overriding interest point first of all. 
Overriding interest arising out of actual occupation 
The case is of interest for the very clear summary provided by Newey J of the relevant case 
law concerning the meaning of “ in actual occupation”, and for the clear application of the 
facts to the relevant law, which will be of great assistance to students. It was common ground 
between the parties that none of the exceptions set out in paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 of the 
Land Registration Act 2002 (LRA 2002) applied as there was no question of any interest 
under a Settled Land Act settlement (para 2(a)); no inquiry had been made by the claimants 
of the defendant prior to the relevant transfer (para 2(b)); and even if the defendant’s 
occupation would not have been obvious on a reasonably careful inspection at the date of the 
relevant transfer, it was common ground that the claimants’ solicitors had knowledge of the 
transfer in favour of the defendant (para 2(c)). Therefore, as none of the exceptions applied, 
the court had to consider whether on the facts the defendant had been in actual occupation in 
order to claim priority over the claimants.  
                                                          
5 See G.Owen, “A New Paradigm for Overreaching—Some Inspiration from Down Under”, pp 377-394 at p380. 
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     Before considering the issue of what constitutes in actual occupation (which is not defined 
in the LRA 2002), consideration had to be given to precisely when an occupier needs to be in 
actual occupation in order for a purchaser to be bound by the rights of the occupier. In Abbey 
National Building Society v Cann 6 this was held to be at the date of the disposition, i.e. the 
completion of the sale by the Charltons to the claimants which was on 20 February 2012. In 
this respect Newey J did not consider the obiter dicta of Lewison J in Thompson v Foy7 to the 
effect that an occupier has to be in occupation at the date of registration as well as the date of 
disposition.  
       t was held as a matter of fact that the defendant had not been physically present himself  
at the property on 20 February 2012, namely the date of completion of the relevant transfer in 
favour of the claimants by the Charltons. However, it is clear from the case law that there 
does not have to be uninterrupted presence. A person may be somewhere else but this does 
not matter as long there is ‘sufficient physical presence8  “to put the purchaser on notice that 
there is someone in occupation.” 9 The court found that although the defendant had not been 
in possession of his barn (which he had been renovating by way of putting in new stabling) 
on 20 February, this did not matter. Newey J found that “ [t]he chances are that Mr Craggs 
was not at the Farm as much once he had finished  constructing the stabling, but he was still 
there often,”10 and “[w]hile, moreover, he happened not to visit the Farm on 20 February, he 
continued to go there frequently, albeit often in connection with activities…in parts of the 
Farm other than the Craggs Barn.”11 
                                                          
6[1991] 1 AC 56. 
7 [2010] 1 P & CR 16. 
8 See M. Davys, Land Law, 9th ed, (Palgrave, 2015), p268. 
9 Arden LJ in Malory Enterprises Ltd v Cheshire Homes (UK) Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 151, [2002] Ch 216, para. 
81. 
10 Judgment of Newey J, para. 19. 
11 Ibid, para. 22. 
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       In arriving at his conclusion that the defendant had been in “actual occupation” on 20 
February 2012 of the land transferred to him, the trial judge took into account Mummery LJ’s 
dictum in Link Lending v Hussein12: 
“ The degree of permanence and continuity of presence of the person concerned, the 
intentions and wishes of that person, the length of absence from the property and the 
reason for it and the nature of the property and personal circumstances of the person are 
among the relevant factors.” [emphasis added] 
During the month prior to 20 February 2012, the defendant had “…demolished the existing 
structure, removed the waste, dug new footings, laid a damp proof course, put concrete on top 
if it and constructed some stables.”13 This degree of permanence can readily be distinguished 
from the acts of planning decoration work in Abbey National Building Society v Cann.14 
Further,  Kingsnorth  Finance Co Ltd v Tizard was cited as authority for the proposition that “ 
[r]egular and repeated absence” can be consistent with actual occupation.15 On the facts of 
Baker, the defendant had clearly demonstrated an intention to return.  
          It should also be borne in mind that in Schedule 3 para 2 of the LRA 2002, occupation 
of part only of the land will no longer confer an overriding interest;16 the whole of the land 
must be occupied. It was held as a matter of fact that the defendant had occupied the yard and 
barn shortly after the date of the transfer in the defendant’s favour on 17 January 2012, and 
that for a period of about a month thereafter: 
 “His presence was neither ‘fleeting’ nor just preparatory to going into occupation. It is 
true that he was not sleeping at the property, but that cannot matter when there was no 
                                                          
12 [2010] EWCA Civ 424 (para. 27). 
13 Judgment of Newey J, at para. 15. 
14 [1991] AC 56. 
15 [1986] I WLR 783, at 788. 
16 Thereby reversing the decision in Ferrishurst Ltd v Wallicite Ltd [1999] Ch 353. 
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residential accommodation there…where the person using a drive owns it and the house it 
serves, it may be proper to consider him to be occupying both house and drive as an 
owner-occupier. Similarly, it seems to me that Mr Craggs will have come to be in ‘actual 
occupation’ of the yard as well as the Craggs Barn.”17 
The issue of whether the defendant had an estate contract is considered below under the 
section concerning overreaching. However, it is felt that a preliminary discussion concerning 
the point should be noted here for two reasons. Firstly, the Law Commission in their 
consultation paper on updating the Land Registration Act 200218 appear to consider that a 
person who takes an interest in precisely the same circumstances as the defendant in Baker v 
Craggs has an estate contract. Secondly, the Law Commission recommends that estate 
contracts should continue as overriding interests. The Law Commission states:19 
“We also note that, at present, a person who takes an interest under a registerable 
disposition (for example, a transfer), but whose application for registration is rejected for 
an administrative reason (perhaps failure to reply to a requisition within the requisite time 
frame), will benefit from an overriding interest if he or she is in actual occupation. Such 
an interest (by definition) falls into the category of interest which it is reasonable to 
expect to be registered. We would, however, be extremely hesitant about removing 
protection in these circumstances. It seems to us that an overriding interest based on 
actual occupation plugs a useful “gap” where otherwise the transferee may be vulnerable 
to a loss of priority, without causing undue prejudice to any person who deals with the 
land during that time.” 
     
                                                          
17 Judgment of Newey J, at para. 20. 
18 Law Commission, “Updating the Land Registration Act 2002: A Consultation Paper” (The Stationery Office, 
2016) Law Com CP No. 227. 
19 Ibid, para 11.26. 
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Overreaching 
Inherent structural problems within the Law of Property Act 1925 concerning the 
meaning of a “legal estate” 
The main interest in the case concerns the apparently conflicting provisions of sections 1 (1); 
1(2) and 1(4) of the LPA1925. The wording of section 1(1) of the LPA1925 provides that the 
the only two estates which can exist at law are an estate in fee simple absolute in possession 
and a term of years absolute.20 Section 1(2) LPA 1925 then goes onto define the only 
interests or charges which can exist at law21 and this list includes: 
“ [a]n easement, right, or privilege in or over land for an interest equivalent to an estate in 
fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute.” 
All other estates, interests and charges are to take effect as equitable interests.22 Section 1(4) 
LPA 1925 then goes onto provide that all of the estates, interests and charges set out in 
sections 1(1) and 1(2) LPA 1925 are to be referred to as “legal estates”, i.e. the definition 
encompasses the two estates in section 1(1) and the five interests set out in section 1(2), 
which together make up this broad definition of “legal estates”.23 Many leading textbooks do 
not comment on section 1(4) LPA 1925,24 presumably to make it clear that there are the two 
legal estates in section 1(1) LPA 1925; the five legal interests in section 1(2) LPA 1925, with 
all other estates and interests taking effect in equity by virtue of section 1(3) LPA 1925.  
Section 1(4) is often not commented upon because it appears to contradict the provisions of 
                                                          
20 See M.Dixon, Editors Notebook, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, (2017) 81 Conv. pp3-5. 
21 Five in total. 
22 Section 1(3) LPA 1925. 
23 See, McFarlane, Hopkins, and Nield, Land Law,Text, Cases, And Materials, 3rd ed, (Oxford, 2015), p 437, fn 
25. 
24 See M.Dixon, Modern Land Law, 10th ed, (Routledge, 2016), pp11-12. 
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section 1(1) LPA 1925 and therefore serves no real purpose, and on that basis it is reasonable 
not to make reference to it.   
    Cheshire and Burn comment on section 1(4)LPA 1925 in the following way: 
“ It will be observed that in referring to the first sub-section as estates  and in the second 
as interests the Act invented a new terminology that depends upon the difference between 
a right to the land itself and a right to some claim against the land of another person.”25 
      …“However, the term ‘legal estate’ is still used as shorthand to refer to both the two legal 
estates (property so-called) and legal interests and charges: LPA 1925, s 1(4).”26 
Notwithstanding this shorthand, it appears that the only right to the land itself after 1925 is by 
either holding the fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute in possession. 
As stated by Gray and Gray:27 
“Since 1 January 1926 all purchasers have known that the only person competent to 
transfer a freehold estate at law is the owner of an estate in fee simple absolute in 
possession. It is correspondingly clear that the only vendor now competent to transfer a 
legal leasehold estate is one who owns a term of years absolute in possession.” 
It seems that the reasons for lumping together a right to the land itself and a right to some 
claim against the land of another person under the generic title of “legal estate” was simply 
to provide that if there were a defect for whatever reason in the creation of these rights, they 
would then take effect in equity.28 There is therefore a broad and a narrow interpretation of 
the term “legal estates”. It does not appear to have been the legislature’s intention for the 
                                                          
25 Cheshire and Burn’s ,Modern Law of Real Property, 18th ed, (Oxford, 2006), p 124. 
26 Ibid, p124, fn, 78. 
27 Gray and Gray, Elements of Land Law, 4th ed, (Oxford, 2005), p171. 
28 Ibid, para 2.126, p 169. 
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expression to have been construed in its broader sense in interpreting the provisions of 
section 2(1) LPA 1925. 
         The developments which led to the drafting of the above sections of the LPA 1925 may 
be seen in paragraphs 24 (b) and (c) of the 1919 Fourth Report of the Acquisition and 
Valuation of Land Committee on the Transfer of Land in England and Wales:29 
   “The main principles of Mr Cherry’s Law of Property Bill may be stated broadly to be:– 
     (a)… 
     (b)To provide that the only estates, interests or charges which, after the Bill becomes 
operative shall be subsisting or capable of being created at law, shall consist of– 
   (i) an estate in freehold land in fee simple; 
   (ii) a term of years absolute 
   (iii) a like estate or term in mines and minerals apart from the surface, or in the surface 
apart from the mines and minerals; 
  (iv) a perpetual rent charge in possession ir reversion; 
  (iv) a rent charge held for a term of years absolute 
  (v) an easement, right or privilege in or over land for an interest equivalent to a like estate or 
term; 
 (vi) any charge secured by a legal term of years absolute 
Such estates will be legal estates, and all other estates, interests and charges will take effect in 
equity only, and will be known as equitable interests. 
                                                          
29 1919 [Cmd. 424]. 
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(c) To place all interests in land except legal estates in fee simple, or for a term of years 
absolute, behind a curtain consisting of either a trust for sale or a settlement… 
Then in Appendix IV of the 1919 Report which is a ‘MEMORANDUM OF MR. B.L. 
CHERRY ON THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTS OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY BILL’. 
paragraph 1 states: 
1. The general principles adopted are as follows: 
(i) That interests in land should be divided into two classes:– 
(a) “Legal Estates” consisting of either the fee simple or a term of years absolute. 
(b) “Equitable interests,” to include all other interests in land,… 
 
      It appears that the intention of the legislature in 1925, having regard to the Fourth Report 
of the Acquisition and Valuation of Land Committee of 1919, was that there were only ever 
meant to be two legal estates in land (i.e. the narrow sense of that expression) with the all of 
the other legal interests, despite their being defined as “legal estates”, being rights of third 
parties in that land. This intention was carried over into the LPA 1925. The issue for the court 
in Baker v Craggs was whether a third party interest such an easement was capable of 
triggering the overreaching provisions of section 2(1) LPA 1925. 
Is a derivative interest in land such as a legal easement capable of triggering overreaching? 
The trial judge held that it could. This part of the judgment30 has been criticised on the basis 
that the reference in section 2(1) of the LPA 1925 to the triggering event for overreaching by 
“[a] conveyance to a purchaser of a legal estate in land” should not include the grant of a 
                                                          
30 See paras 26-33 of the judgment. 
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legal easement. The problem here concerns the provisions of section 1(4) of LPA 1925 which 
appear to contradict the provisions of section 1(1) LPA 1925. On that basis, interests and 
charges such as an easement and a legal mortgage set out in section 2(2) LPA 1925 are also 
to be treated as a “legal estates”. This formed a crucial part of the judgment. At para 27, 
Newey J said: 
“ While section 1(1) states that an ‘estate in fee simple absolute in possession’ and a ‘term 
of years absolute’ are the ‘only estates in land which are capable of subsisting or of being 
conveyed or created at law, section 1(4) explains that the ‘estates, interests, and charges’ 
authorised to subsist or to be conveyed or created at law by the section are referred to in 
the Act as ‘legal estates’. The definition thus extends to the various interests ‘capable of 
subsisting or of being conveyed or created at law’ specified in section 1(2). These include 
an ‘easement, right, or privilege in or over land for an interest equivalent to an estate in 
fee simple absolute in possession or a term of years absolute.’” 
On this reasoning Newey J held that as the term “legal estate” included an easement, and that 
the grant of a legal easement (a limited interest) could trigger the relevant overreaching 
provisions. On its face, this is a rather surprising result and the academic reasons for this have 
been cogently argued elsewhere.31  In fairness, the trial judge would say that he was merely 
following the provisions of the LPA 1925 by reference to which section 1(4) LPA 1925 
apparently equates an easement referred to in section 2(a) LPA 1925 to a “legal estate” so as 
to bring the grant of an easement within the overreaching machinery of section 2(1) LPA 
1925. However, section 2(1) LPA 1925 was surely only ever intended to allow conveyances 
of  legal estates of the fee simple and of the term of years absolute to trigger overreaching. 
Cherry’s memorandum referred to above makes it quite clear as to what he understood by the 
                                                          
31 See M. Dixon, Editors Notebook, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, (2017) 81 Conv. pp 4-5. See also, 
Emmett & Farrand on Title, paras 5.141-5.143.- 
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term legal estate, i.e. the right to the land itself, not third party rights affecting that land. On 
that basis, it is only when that land itself is sold that overreaching can occur and not when a 
third party interest in that land is granted. Overreaching takes place when the beneficiary’s 
interest in the land itself is converted into the proceeds of sale of the land, which is hardly the 
case on the grant of a legal easement in the land.  
    Of course, this presupposes that overreaching means the transfer of an interest in property 
to its proceeds (the narrow view of overreaching). The author has considered whether a 
broader meaning of overreaching could be applied to make the trial judge’s reasoning on this 
point more explicable. Overreaching has also been used in another sense, namely the 
“[s]subordination of one interest to another”.32 The reference to overreaching in this broader 
sense has nothing to do with any proceeds of sale. The author has unearthed an example of 
overreaching in this broad sense as far back as the seventeenth century.33 In terms of 
regarding overreaching as the “transfer of an interest in property to its proceeds”34 the 
decision looks somewhat odd. As Dixon says, “[h]ow will the beneficiaries’ interest take 
effect in the purchase money paid for the easement?”35 However, in terms of simply 
subordinating one interest to another the decision becomes more explicable. However, there 
are arguments against this approach.  
   First, Newey J did not rely on this interpretation, so it did not form part of the judgment 
which led to his conclusion. Secondly, the seventeenth century authority cited by the author is 
very old. Thirdly, Emmett & Farrand cite a passage from Wolstenholme and Cherry’s 
                                                          
32 Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 8th ed, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012),p 136. See also the discussion 
at paras 6-056 and 25-073 concerning the right of a mortgagor and mortgagee  in possession to grant leases 
subordinating the subordinating the interests of the mortgagee/mortgagee. However, these rights arise under 
specific provisions in the LPA 1925 and are therefore different in nature from the point being discussed in the 
text.  
33 See Fox v Prickwood, (1614) 2 Bulst. 224; 80 E.R. 1079. This is discussed in G. Owen, “A New Model for 
Overreaching—Some Historical Inspiration”, (2015) 79 Conv. p 228. 
34 Megarry & Wade, The Law of Real Property, 8th ed, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2012), p137. 
35 Dixon, Editors Notebook, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, p4. However, see the reasoning of Newey 
J. in the hypothetical case detailed in para. 32 of his judgment.  
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Conveyancing Statutes36 which states that the the narrow view of overreaching has been used 
since 1882. Finally, the author has carefully considered the Fourth Report of the Acquisition 
and Valuation of Land Committee of the Transfer of Land in England and Wales and cannot 
find any evidence to support the broader interpretation of overreaching in this context. 
   This is not to say that in the context of some of the provisions of the LPA 1925 the 
expression legal interests cannot always be equated to estates in land without difficulty. For 
instance “all legal interests in land are ‘estates in land’ for the purposes of LPA 1925, s 52 
(see LPA 1925, s 1(4))…”37 However, in the context of overreaching the position is very 
different and it is suggested that the judge’s reasoning on this point was per incuriam and that 
the matter should be reconsidered by another court or by the Law Commission. 
 
     I 
The nature of the defendant’s interest—when is an estate contract not an estate contract? 
In order to determine whether the defendant’s interest was capable of being overreached, the 
court had to determine the precise nature of that interest, as not all interests are capable of 
being overreached. Counsel for the defendant argued that the nature of the defendant’s 
interest was, in truth, an estate contract, based upon the contract entered into between the 
Charltons and the defendant, and as such was incapable of being overreached pursuant to 
section 2(3) (iv) Law of Property Act 1925. The defendant premised his argument on the 
footing that between exchange of contracts and the time when the defendant became the 
registered proprietor of the yard, the defendant’s equitable interest (i.e. his interest in the 
                                                          
36 Wolstenholme and Cherry’s Conveyancing Statutes 13th ed, 1972 vol .1.p51. See Emmett & Farrand at para 
5.141. 
37 See M. Davys, Land Law, 9th ed, (Palgrave, 2015), p196. 
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yard) had no independent existence beyond the contract which had created it, and remained 
an estate contract up until the time when it merged with the title on registration.  
     The defendant cited Lloyds Bank plc v Carrick in support of this argument.38 It will be 
recalled in that case the court held that Mrs Carrick had an estate contract based upon her 
specifically-performable contract for the purchase of an interest in land.39 In order for Mrs 
Carrick to win her case against the bank, which was claiming possession from her, she had to 
show that she had acquired an interest separate and distinct from the contract. The reason for 
this was because Carrick concerned unregistered land and as Mrs Carrick had not protected 
her interest as a C(iv) land charge (i.e. the estate contract) the bank were not on notice of her 
rights. It was for this reason that she had to assert rights outside of the contract; and the court 
held that she could not. Counsel for the defendant seized upon this finding and argued by 
parity of reasoning that it should be open to the defendant to argue that his rights, too, had no 
independent existence outside of the contract, thereby bringing the defendant within the 
ambit of section 2(3)(iv) of the Law of Property Act 1925.  
    However, as noted by the trial judge in his judgment, there is the world of difference 
between the facts of this case and Carrick.  In Baker v Craggs, there was a transfer in the 
defendant’s favour; there was no transfer in Mrs Carrick’s favour. Thus, in Baker, the judge 
held that the contract merged in the transfer to the defendant, thereby rendering the contract 
spent at that point. In Carrick there was no transfer into which the contract could merge, and 
that is why her interest remained contractual. 
                                                          
38 [1996] 4 All ER 630. 
39 Carrick was a case which pre-dated the provisions of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1989, and was decided by reference to the old provisions rendering unenforceable contracts for the sale of land 
in the absence of a written memorandum or sufficient acts of part performance.  
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       Counsel for the claimants cited in argument the dictum of Baroness Hale in Mortgage 
Business plc v O’Shaughnessy 40: 
“There is a gap between any transaction and its registration…Until registration, the 
purchaser (and indeed the mortgagee) have only equitable interests. This might suggest 
that rights granted by the purchaser to an occupier could not be ‘fed’ until registration. 
However, this is machinery, not substance. Assuming that all relevant registration 
requirements are met, the purchaser has now acquired an absolute right to the legal estate 
(and the mortgagee an absolute right to the charge). Her interest is of a different order 
from that of a purchaser before completion, who has the contractual right to have the 
property conveyed to her but may never in fact get it.” 
In other words, according to the judgment in Baker v Craggs, following exchange of 
contracts but prior to completion, the defendant had an estate contract but after completion 
took place, that contract was spent and became subsumed by way of merger in the transfer.  
The transfer of the yard in favour of the defendant took place on 17 January 2012 and it was 
on date that the judge held that the defendant’s estate contract was spent. Therefore, when the 
Charltons granted the claimants their rights over the yard by one of the transfers dated 20 
February 2012, the defendant no longer had an estate contract to defeat overreaching. Rather, 
he held an equitable estate which was capable of being overreached and, on that basis, the 
defendant’s rights were overreached and his registration of the yard was subject to the 
claimants’ easement. 
        
However, the matter is not free from doubt and Dixon has argued cogently that: 
                                                          
40 [2014] UKSC 52. 
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“ It is, however, arguable that a contract for the grant of a legal estate is still in existence 
until the legal estate is granted, and this is now the moment of registration, not the 
moment of completion. Indeed, this would be consistent with the earlier finding in this 
very case that the Charlton’s still owned legal title because Mr Craggs was not 
registered…and the heart of the matter is whether the advent of registered title has 
changed the well-established rule, developed when there was no registration 
requirements, that a contract merges with the transfer on completion. The notion of ‘title 
by registration’ would seem to support a change, but the pragmatic positions taken in 
Abbey National v Cann and Scott v Pacific Mortgages (on the nature of conveyancing 
transactions and their separateness) might not. ”41 
At paragraph 40 of his judgment, Newey J cited the decision in Knight Co Ltd v Alberta 
Railway & Irrigation Co.42 In this Privy Council case “after quoting and considering 
Canadian provisions, the conclusion reached was that agreements for sale merged with 
transfers when registered…”43 It is difficult, therefore, to follow the trial judge’s reasoning 
when he cited it as authority for the proposition that a contract for the sale of registered land 
merges into a transfer.44  This is not a binding authority in this jurisdiction and from the 
above discussion the point is still fraught with difficulty.  
 
Conclusions 
Baker v Craggs serves as a salutary reminder to practitioners to ensure that they supply plans 
which are land registry compliant.45 Had proper plans been prepared at the outset, it may well 
                                                          
41 Dixon, Editors Notebook, The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, p 3. 
42 [1938] 1 All ER 266. 
43 Emmet & Farrand, para 5,143. 
44 See para 40 of judgment of Newey  J. 
45 See Guidance for preparing plans for Land Registry applications, updated 20 January 2017.  
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be the case the Land Registry would not have raised any requisitions with the result that the 
defendant’s application for registration would have proceeded smoothly and attained priority 
over the claimants’ application. Further, once requisitions are raised, they should be answered 
promptly. As the case shows, a cancellation of an application to register in the registration 
gap can lead to a loss of priority.  
     The case does not clarify the position as to when an estate contract ceases to be an estate 
contract in the context of registered land. By reference to the sources cited in this case note, it 
appears that the Law Commission is clear that an unregistered transfer is an estate contact 
until it is registered. However, this is at variance with the decision in Baker v Craggs and also 
with some of the authorities cited in the judgment. It is suggested that a more appropriate 
question for the Law Commission to consider would be whether a contract for the purchase 
of registered land merges on completion or on registration, and then to consider whether it 
should still be capable of achieving overriding status. 
    In the context of overreaching, the case should be viewed as one in which the trial judge 
applied too broad an interpretation to the term “legal estate” in the context of section 2(1) 
LPA 1925. For the reasons put forward in this case note, this was never the legislature’s 
intention and, at best, it must be an unintended consequence of section 1(4) LPA 1925. The 
judgment of Newey J on this point may well be considered by another court or by the Law 
Commission. 
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